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Abstract: Conventional wisdom has it that a central bank which employs an 
informational advantage to undertake active policy intervention can do as well, at 
least so far as real outcomes are concerned, by making its information publicly 
available and abstaining from stabilization. This notion is examined using a 
framework incorporating heterogeneous private sector information concerning 
aggregate demand shocks. An activist regime, in which the central bank exploits its 
own information to engage in stabilization, is found to be unambiguously superior to a 
non-interventionist regime, where the central bank maintains a constant setting of 
policy but publicly discloses its own information.  
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“ … if superior information is the basis for potential stabilization, there is a 
much easier way for the government to accomplish that stabilization than 
following a complex policy rule: it can simply announce the information that 
the public does not have.” David Romer (2011, p.300) 
 
1. Introduction 
The advent of the rational expectations hypothesis posed a fundamental challenge to 
the belief that, by engaging in active stabilization policy, governments could improve 
macroeconomic outcomes relative to a laissez-faire approach, in which the (alleged) 
self-stabilizing properties of the economy are relied upon to return the economy to 
equilibrium following any exogenous shock. Although it was recognized that an 
information advantage on the part of the monetary authority might possibly provide 
the foundation for beneficial policy intervention (Barro, 1976), equally it was argued 
that essentially the same result could be achieved by the monetary authority making 
its own information publicly available. The conventional wisdom on this issue is well 
summarized by the above quotation from Romer (2011).
1
 Subsequently, any 
underpinnings for an interventionist stance on macroeconomic policy have been 
viewed as reliant on the presence of nominal rigidities which imply that wages and/or 
prices cannot react as quickly to information as monetary policy is able (important 
early contributions in this vein include Fischer, 1977; Taylor 1979, 1980).  
The intention of the present paper is to re-examine the question of whether superior 
information might, in itself, provide the basis for the advocacy of activist monetary 
policy. The motive for revisiting this issue stems from the developing body of 
literature whose focus lies on the equilibrium and welfare properties of economies 
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characterized by dispersed private information: see, for example, Morris and Shin 
(2002), Hellwig (2005), Angeletos and Pavan (2007a, 2007b), Cornand and 
Heinemann (2008), and James and Lawler (2011, 2012a,b). A finding emphasized by 
this literature is the possibility that, in the presence of heterogeneous information, 
strategic and external effects might lead to departures from efficiency. This is the case 
in the model employed in what follows, where such departures play a central role.  
The framework described below, incorporating monopolistically-competitive price-
setting firms, derives from Woodford (2002, 2003), Adam (2007), and Roca (2010), 
with variants of it also applied in recent work by, for example, Baeriswyl and 
Cornand (2010, 2011) and Hahn (2014). Its key feature is that the pricing decisions of 
individual firms are associated with a strategic complementarity. In the presence of 
heterogeneous firm-specific information on the realized value of any shock, the 
strategic complementarity implies that the equilibrium price response to any public 
information released by the central bank is inefficient from the viewpoint of social 
welfare. The principal results of the paper then derive from this latter feature. 
The focus of the study is the following issue: does an interventionist approach to 
monetary policy, directed at maximizing expected welfare, lead to outcomes superior 
in terms of the expected welfare criterion to those attained by passive policy? In 
addressing this question, activist policy is represented by a state-contingent rule which 
responds to the central bank’s estimate of aggregate disturbances; the passive policy 
regime, on the other hand, is characterized by a fixed monetary rule combined with 
full public disclosure of the central bank’s information. The logic underlying the view 
that disclosure by the monetary authority of its own information to the private sector 
can substitute for policy activism suggests that the two regimes are equivalent, as least 
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insofar as their implications for real macroeconomic outcomes are concerned. 
However, the key finding of the current study is that, despite the absence of price 
rigidities, activist policy achieves an unambiguously superior welfare outcome to that 
associated with the passive regime. We also demonstrate that this conclusion is robust 
to alternative informational assumptions to those that characterize the basic model. 
The question which provides the main focus of the present study is, of course, closely 
related to that concerning the desirability, or otherwise, of central bank transparency.
2
 
However, the two issues are distinct in a fundamental respect. Specifically, the 
modern debate regarding central bank transparency does not, in itself, reflect any 
difference of view regarding the need for active policy intervention. Rather, the 
interest lies in whether the efficacy of stabilization policy is improved or impaired by 
public disclosure of the central bank’s information. On the other hand, the position 
represented in the quotations taken from Barro (1976) and Romer (2011) asserts 
definitively that central bank communication can serve as a substitute for policy 
activism and, in this regard, carries with it particularly strong implications for the 
appropriate conduct of policy. Notwithstanding this important distinction, our study 
does briefly consider the connection between the two issues in the context of the 
present model.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and 
describes the informational assumptions which characterize the alternative policy 
regimes. Section 3 then identifies and compares the equilibrium outcomes under the 
two regimes and establishes the central result of the paper. Our findings are 
interpreted and related to those of other work concerned with the interaction between 
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public and private information in Section 4. Section 5 then considers alternative 
information scenarios, before some brief concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.  
 
2. The Model 
Underlying the component relationships of the model is a simple micro-founded 
general equilibrium framework developed in previous contributions by Woodford 
(2002, 2003), Adam (2007), and Roca (2010). In essence, the private sector comprises 
a representative household and a continuum of monopolistically-competitive firms, 
uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Household utility is defined over leisure 
and consumption, the latter described by a Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregator over the 
varieties of differentiated goods. 
Monetary policy is conducted by a central bank whose aim is to maximize household 
welfare, where the latter can be represented (as a second-order approximation) by: 
                 
1
2 2
0
[ ( ) ]iW p p di y   
                                                                       
(1)
 
where y represents the output gap, i.e. the deviation of actual output from its ‘natural’ 
level,
3
 ip  is the price set by firm i, and )(
1
0
 dipp i  identifies the average price across 
all firms (i.e. the price level). Thus, realized welfare for the household is dependent 
both on the degree of price dispersion and on the size of the output gap. The 
coefficient  , which determines the relative significance of the two arguments of the 
welfare function, is a structural parameter whose value is dependent on the 
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household’s degree of risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between goods in 
consumption, )1( . 
Consideration of the profit maximization problem of the individual firm identifies its 
optimal price, ip , to be a linear combination of the expected price level and output 
gap: 
  
)( ypEp ii 
                                                                                  
(2) 
where iE  represents firm i’s expectation, conditional on the information available to 
it. With prices assumed to be perfectly flexible, each firm’s actual price is always at 
its perceived optimal value. The responsiveness of ip  to the expected output gap is 
determined by the parameter 
 
which identifies the degree of strategic 
complementarity between prices. In principle, it is possible for prices to be strategic 
substitutes but our analysis focuses on the realistic case of strategic complementarity, 
associated with )1,0( .4 Important for the evaluation of welfare outcomes is the 
fact that the coefficients   and   are related by  / , implying   . 
The setting of the central bank’s policy instrument, g, determines the economy’s level 
of aggregate nominal demand, n, subject to the realization of a stochastic aggregate 
demand shock,  , assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution over the real 
line.
5
 Shocks to aggregate demand can be taken as representative of a broader class of 
shock which leave the relationship between the full information equilibrium and the 
associated socially optimal outcome unchanged. For shocks of this nature, which 
include those to production technology and to household preferences, the inefficiency 
referred to in the Introduction, and which underlies the key findings of this paper, 
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derives from the presence of uncertainty: under complete information equilibrium 
outcomes would be efficient. An alternative category of shock, specifically any 
affecting the degree of monopoly power in goods and/or labor markets, gives rise to 
departures from efficiency even under complete information. Such shocks are 
invariably associated with fluctuations in the gap between full information 
equilibrium and socially optimal outcomes. Although these fluctuations introduce 
additional considerations relevant to the conduct of stabilization policy, they do not 
affect the conclusions drawn in the analysis which follows.   
 
The relationship between aggregate nominal demand, the setting of the central bank’s 
policy instrument and the aggregate demand shock can be expressed as 
( )n p y g     . On rearrangement this becomes: 
 
  y = g – p +          (3) 
It follows from (3) that equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
  
])()([
2
1
0
2    gpdippW i
     
(1′) 
while firm i’s pricing equation (2) can now be expressed as: 
   )]()1[(   gpEp ii       (2′) 
We note that in the current flexible price framework, price dispersion, as represented 
by the first term on the right hand side of (1′), arises only as a result of the 
heterogeneity of private information and the associated firm-specific expectational 
errors.
6
 On the other hand, any departure of the price level from the value which 
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would eliminate the output gap, as captured by the second term of (1′), reflects 
expectational errors which are common across firms: such errors are associated with 
volatility in output. The presence within the model of heterogeneous information 
gives rise to a trade-off between (price) dispersion and (output) volatility, with the 
differing implications of the alternative policy regimes for the equilibrium trade-off 
central to this study’s conclusions. 
We now turn to the informational assumptions which characterize our analysis. Prices 
are set before the realized value of the aggregate demand shock is known. However, 
prior to making its pricing decision, firm i observes an idiosyncratic noisy signal of 
 : each firm’s signal is private information in the sense that it cannot be observed by 
any other firm. We denote the signal received by firm i by i , where: 
 
 ii                                                                                            (4) 
 
The noise term, ),0(~
2
 Ni , is assumed independent of   with   0jiE   for 
ij  , while 0
1
0
 dii . 
Before setting its price, in addition to its private signal each firm may, at the 
discretion of the central bank, also have access to a common public signal. The central 
bank, like firms, does not know the true value of the aggregate demand shock before 
choosing any action of its own, but rather observes its own noisy signal,  , of  ’s 
realization, where: 
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                                                                                              (5) 
 
The error term, ),0(~ 2 N , is independent of   and uncorrelated with the 
corresponding private sector noise terms, i.e.   iE i  ,0 . Whether or not the 
central bank reveals its own information to the private sector is central to the 
distinction between the alternative policy regimes discussed and analyzed in the next 
section. 
 
 
3. Equilibrium and Macroeconomic Stability under the Alternative Policy 
Regimes 
Our interest in this section lies in determining whether the behavior of the real 
economy is independent of whether the central bank employs its own information to 
engage in active stabilization or, alternatively, simply reveals this information to the 
private sector and itself abstains from policy intervention. In examining this issue, we 
first identify the nature of the equilibrium associated with the activist regime, then 
consider macroeconomic outcomes when monetary policy is passive but the central 
bank announces its own information publicly. 
 
Policy activism with undisclosed central bank information 
The activist regime is characterized in terms of commitment to a policy rule which 
determines the setting of policy as a function of the central bank’s current 
information. In this section we assume that neither the central bank nor any firm is 
able to observe the chosen action of any other agent prior to making its own decision. 
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Thus firm i cannot observe g or any 
jp (j ≠ i) prior to setting ip , 
while the central 
bank cannot observe any ip  
before implementing its choice of g. It follows that the 
central bank’s sole source of information regarding the realized value of   is the 
signal,   that it observes. Given the linear-quadratic structure of the model, optimal 
policy can be represented as a linear decision rule of the form: 
 
                     g                       (6)7 
 
As well as the central bank’s stance on policy intervention, also crucial to the 
distinction between the two regimes is the information on which private sector actions 
are based. Under the activist policy regime, the central bank’s own signal is not part 
of any firm’s information set. Hence pricing decisions are conditioned only on each 
firm’s private signal. Noting that iii EE   )|()|( , and using the policy rule 
described by (6), firm i’s price can be expressed, from (2′), as: 
 
 iii
pEp  )1()|()1( 
     
(7) 
 
To identify the equilibrium outcome of these pricing decisions, we use the method of 
undetermined coefficients, assuming a price response function of the form: 
 
 iip  10                                                                                   (8) 
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Noting the property 0
1
0

i
idi , it follows that  10 p . Substituting this 
expression for p into (7), we find: 
 
 iip  ])1()1([)1( 10                                          (9) 
 
Equating coefficients across (8) and (9) yields: 
 
 00    
 11  
 
It follows that firm i’s price and the price level are given respectively by: 
 
 ii
p )1( 
    
(10a);
     
)1( p
                      
(10b) 
 
Equation (10) implies that the departure of firm i’s price from the economy-wide 
average price is given by: 
   
   ii pp )1(                  (11) 
 
while using (6) and (10b) together with (3) allows the equilibrium output gap to be 
identified: 
 
  y
                  
(12) 
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Equilibrium (unconditional) expected welfare can now be found by substituting 
equations (11) and (12) into (1) and applying the expectations operator: 
 
 
])1[()( 2222   WE
              
(13) 
 
Minimizing the above expression over   allows us to identify the optimal value,  , 
of the rule parameter:  
 
 
22
2
*







                 
(14)
 
 
Note that, outside the limiting cases of perfect central bank information ( 02  ) and 
a completely uninformed private sector ( 2 ), 01
*   . Hence, the optimal 
rule requires that policy only partially offset the central bank’s expectation of the 
shock (i.e. ( | )E    ). To explain this feature of optimal policy, we note that if 
monetary policy were designed to fully offset the central bank’s estimate of   , the 
expectation of each firm would be that the setting of the monetary instrument would 
fully neutralize the impact of the shock (since, for 1   , 
( ) ( | ) 0i iE E        ). Consequently, prices would not respond at all to 
firms’ private information. Although this would lead to the complete elimination of 
price dispersion, the associated welfare gain would be outweighed by the effect of the 
accompanying increase in output volatility, reflecting the non-utilization of the 
information content of firms’ private signals.8  
 
14 
 
Now substituting the expression for   into (13), and using 
*
( )AE W
 
 to represent 
equilibrium expected welfare under activism when policy is set optimally:  
 
 
*
( )AE W
 
 
22
22





                 
(15) 
 
Passive monetary policy with central bank announcements 
We now turn to consider equilibrium outcomes when the central bank refrains from 
adjusting its setting of monetary policy in response to its own information, but 
discloses the observed value of its signal to the private sector. From the properties of 
,   and i , the optimal predictor of   conditional on i  and   is: 
 
  )1(),|(  iii EE ,        )(
222
                               (16) 
 
For comparability with the activist regime, we normalize the fixed setting of the 
central bank’s instrument to zero (i.e. g ≡ 0) so that the mean level of nominal income 
is identical under the alternative policy regimes. Equation (2′) then implies:  
                         
  
])1([),|()1(   iii pEp              (17) 
 
We again determine equilibrium by employing the method of undetermined 
coefficients, positing that firm i’s price is now set according to: 
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  210 kkkp ii                                              (18) 
 
which implies that the price level is described by  210 kkkp  . Substituting the 
expected value (conditional on i  and  ) of this expression into (17): 
  
       
  ])1)[(1()1(])1([)1( 2110 kkkkp ii               (19) 
 
Equating coefficients across (18) and (19) and using the definition of   we find: 
         00 k          22
2
1





k      
2
2 2 2
k

 

 


 
Substituting these expressions into (18), then aggregating over firms, identifies the 
equilibrium values of ip  and p :  
 
          22
22







i
ip           
(20a);
  22
22






p
                 
(20b) 
 
Hence the deviation of ip  from p  is: 
  
 
22
2





 ii pp
                 
(21)
 
 
while substituting (20b) into (3) yields: 
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22
2





y
                               
(22) 
 
Equilibrium expected welfare in the case of passive policy, which we denote by 
)( PWE , is then found by substituting equations (21) and (22) into (1) : 
 
 )( PWE
222
22222
)(
)(






                           
(23) 
 
Inspection of equations (15) and (23) reveals that, apart from the special cases in 
which one or other of the central bank or the private sector observes either a fully 
informative or a completely uninformative signal, the two policy regimes are 
characterized by different welfare outcomes. Noting that, as previously identified, 
  , direct comparison of equations (15) and (23) allows us to formulate the 
following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Passive monetary policy with public disclosure of the central bank’s 
signal is associated with an unambiguously lower value of expected welfare than the 
activist regime, i.e.
 
)( PWE <
*
( )AE W
 
 
 
The finding summarized by Proposition 1, which represents the principal conclusion 
of the paper, stands in clear contrast to the conventional wisdom, as exemplified in the 
quotation from Romer (2011) reproduced earlier. In the next section we turn to 
consider the economic logic which underlies this result. 
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4. Discussion 
The key to the comparative welfare properties of the alternative policy regimes lies in 
the strategic complementarity which underlies firms’ pricing decisions. As noted in 
the Introduction, in the presence of heterogeneous information, strategic 
complementarity (or substitutability) can lead agents to respond to that information 
inefficiently.  Central to the nature of this inefficiency is the distinction drawn by 
Angeletos and Pavan (2007b) between the ‘equilibrium degree of coordination’ and 
the ‘socially optimal degree of coordination’. The former identifies the private benefit 
that individuals place on aligning their own actions with those of others, while the 
latter relates to the social benefit of such alignment. In the present context, with 
  , the equilibrium degree of coordination, 1 , lies below the socially optimal 
degree of coordination, 1 . The relevance of this feature of the model for the 
characteristics of equilibrium under passive monetary policy can be demonstrated by 
determining the collectively-optimal individual price responses to private and public 
signals within this regime.  
 
We again specify the individual firm’s price to be a linear function of i  and  : 
 
  210
~~~
kkkp ii                                                                         (24) 
 
implying the average price is given by  210
~~~
kkkp  . The consequent expression 
for the deviation of firm i’s price from the price level is simply ii kpp 1
~
 , while 
that for the output gap is 0 1 2(1 )y k k k      . Substituting these expressions into 
(1), the first order conditions for 0
~
k , 
1
~
k  and 2
~
k  then yield: 
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0
~
0 k          22
2
1
~





k      
2
2 2 2
k

 

 


 
 
It is straightforward to confirm that 
11
~
kk   and, hence, 22
~
kk  . Therefore, in the 
context of passive monetary policy with public disclosure of the central bank’s 
information, each firm’s price response places excessive weight, relative to the 
efficient level, on private information. This characteristic derives from the fact, 
identified above, that the equilibrium degree of coordination is less than the efficient 
degree of coordination: that is, the incentives which face individual firms to align 
their prices with those set by other firms understate the collective benefit of 
alignment.  
 
The values of ip  and p  associated with efficient responses to the observed signals 
can be identified as:  
 
         22
22







i
ip           
(25a);
  22
22






p
                 
(25b) 
 
with the departure of ip  from p in this instance described by: 
 
 
22
2





 ii pp
                 
(26) 
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and the output gap equal to: 
 
 
22
2





y
                               
(27) 
 
Comparison of equations (21) and (22) with (26) and (27) establishes that, for given 
signal observations, equilibrium price-setting leads to larger departures of the 
individual firm price from the average value, but a smaller output gap, than is socially 
optimal. Alternatively put, the equilibrium trade-off between dispersion and volatility 
under passive policy diverges from the socially-optimal trade-off. This feature reflects 
the overweighting of private information in equilibrium price responses to the 
observed signals, which acts to exacerbate the effect of idiosyncratic errors on price 
dispersion. The effect of this on expected welfare is mitigated somewhat by the 
reduction in output gap volatility, as the underweighting of the public signal implies a 
lessened degree of commonality in pricing behavior. However, the net effect is an 
unambiguous fall in expected welfare below the value associated with socially-
efficient price-setting. 
 
Now substituting (26) and (27) into (1) to determine the resulting value of expected 
welfare, )
~
( PWE , when policy is passive but prices respond to information in an 
efficient manner:  
 
 )
~
( PWE
22
22





                           
(28) 
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Given the inefficiency which characterizes equilibrium price-setting under passive 
policy, it is evident that )( PWE < )
~
( PWE , as is straightforward to confirm by 
comparison of (23) with (28). However, comparing (15) with (28), it is apparent that 
expected welfare under the activist regime is identical to that which would be 
achieved under passive monetary policy if prices were to respond efficiently to the 
observed private and public signals. In this sense, active policy intervention enables 
the attainment of the first best outcome.
9
 
 
The ability of the activist regime to ensure that all available information is exploited 
efficiently can be explained as follows. In the presence of the strategic 
complementarity discussed above, the equilibrium price-setting strategy of firm i 
defines ip  
as a weighted average of the firm’s expectation of the ‘fundamentals’ (i.e. 
the net impact of the shock,  , and monetary policy) and its expectation of the 
average price,
10
 as represented by (2′). If the central bank does not disclose its own 
information regarding  , then firm i’s best estimate of p is simply its own price, i.e. 
ii ppE )( . Thus )(  gEp ii , with the direct effect of the strategic 
complementarity on price setting eliminated. Moreover, since each firm’s 
expectations are formed solely on the basis of its own private signal, 
iii EE   )()( : hence (1 )i ip    . For ( 1,0)  , it is clear that the more 
responsive policy is to the central bank’s signal the less responsive prices will be to 
firm-specific signals. The value of the rule parameter therefore determines the relative 
weights placed on the different sources of information in the joint responses of 
monetary policy and prices to shocks. The optimal value of   ensures that these 
weights reflect both the relative accuracy of the two signals and the social value of 
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price coordination. Hence it leads, in contrast to the passive policy regime, to the 
efficient use of available information. 
 
The principles outlined in the preceding discussion are also central to the conclusions 
drawn in James and Lawler (2011, 2012a,b). In each of these studies, abstract models 
incorporating heterogeneous information are applied to examine the social welfare 
consequences of public disclosure of information that is otherwise private to the 
policymaker in the presence of optimal stabilization policy. Their concern thus lies 
with the issue that provides the focus of the modern debate relating to central bank 
transparency. As noted in the Introduction, this issue is distinct from the question 
considered in the present contribution, that is whether public dissemination of the 
central bank’s information can eliminate the need for active policy intervention. 
Nonetheless, the two issues are evidently related. In order to identify the precise 
nature of the connection between them, we use the current framework to briefly 
consider the implications of central bank disclosure of its signal,  , in the context of 
the activist regime. 
 
In this instance, the central bank, besides using the observation of its signal to 
determine the setting of its policy instrument, as described by (6), also publicly 
announces the value of  . The latter thus becomes part of the private sector’s 
information set, as in the passive policy regime examined in Section 3. Importantly, in 
addition to modifying each firm’s estimate of   compared to when only its own 
signal is observed, this also provides precise knowledge of the central bank’s 
instrument setting.  
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In order to determine equilibrium in the present context, the same steps are followed 
as in Section 3’s consideration of the activist regime, but now recognizing that firm i 
sets its price conditional not only on i , but also on  . Denoting firm i’s equilibrium 
price under policy activism but with disclosure of the central bank’s signal by )(DA
ip , 
and under passive policy, as described by (20a), by P
ip , we find that 
 Pi
DA
i pp
)( . It follows immediately from the implied value of p,
 
)(DAp ,  that 
public disclosure of   implies that price dispersion in the activist regime becomes 
identical to that under passive policy. This isomorphism extends to the behavior of 
aggregate output, as is evident from substituting (6), together with the value for 
)(DAp
,
 
into (3). Hence, in announcing   publicly, the central bank renders policy 
completely ineffective and engenders an identical welfare outcome to that attained 
when policy is passive. It follows that Proposition 1 indirectly identifies central bank 
transparency to be undesirable in the context of activist policy.
11
  
 
The logic underlying this finding is discussed in the aforementioned papers by James 
and Lawler (2011, 2012a,b). In essence, due to its underestimation of the value of 
aligning its price with those of others, the individual firm regards socially-optimal 
policy intervention as sub-optimal from the viewpoint of its own objectives. In 
making its own signal common knowledge, the central bank provides each firm with 
the information that it needs to offset, by appropriate adjustment of its price, the 
perceived detrimental impact of policy on its profitability. Of course, with all firms 
acting in the same way, the economy is driven to an inferior equilibrium.
12
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We note that this conclusion appears, at first sight, to be at variance with those of 
Roca (2010) and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2011). Both papers consider the desirability 
of central bank transparency within essentially the same model as employed in the 
current study, with each finding that, for empirically plausible parameter values, 
transparency is beneficial to welfare. However, the difference with our own 
conclusions can be explained by the fact that both in Roca and in Baeriswyl and 
Cornand the price level is assumed to be a component of the policy authority’s 
objectives. Given that it is the dispersion of prices around the average, rather than the 
absolute value of the latter, which is important for welfare, the formulation of policy 
in the two papers can be regarded as non-optimal from the viewpoint of the model’s 
underlying welfare function, as described by (1). With policy conducted non-
optimally, it is clearly possible for public dissemination of the information on which 
this policy is based to improve welfare.
13
 
 
 
5. Alternative Information Scenarios 
We return to the main theme of the paper by considering two modifications to the 
informational assumptions which have characterized the analysis to this point, both of 
which relate to the potential sources of public information. The first recognizes the 
validity of Svensson’s (2006, p.451) observation, in commenting on Morris and Shin 
(2002), that there is “... always some public information (available)…” regardless of 
central bank disclosure. Thus an additional public signal, outside the control of the 
central bank and independent of the policy regime, is introduced into the model.
14
 The 
second amends the assumed timing of moves which has characterized the analysis of 
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the activist regime to this point, and allows each firm to observe (subject to an 
idiosyncratic error) the setting of policy before determining its price.  
 
All firms observe an additional common signal 
We now assume that under both policy regimes the central bank and the private sector 
each observes an imperfect public signal of the aggregate demand shock, v    , 
where ),0(~
2
 N  and is uncorrelated both with any i  and with  . In considering 
the activist regime, the policy rule must incorporate a potential response to v  in 
addition to that associated with  . Hence the rule is now described by 1 2g v    . 
Applying the same solution steps to those employed in the analysis of Section 3, 
equilibrium price setting under policy activism is found to give rise to a departure of 
firm i’s price from the average price as given by:  
 
  
2
1
2 2
(1 )
( )
i
ip p

 
  
 

 

                                                                     
(29)
 
 
while aggregate output is determined according to: 
 
  
2
1
12 2
(1 )
( )
y

 
  
 
 

  

                
(30) 
 
We note that the policy rule parameter, 2 , relating to the common signal, v , is not 
present in these expressions. Reflecting the logic discussed in the preceding section, 
the socially-optimal policy response to v  is viewed by price-setters as sub-optimal 
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from their individualistic perspectives. With common knowledge of v  rendering any 
systematic policy response to its observed value perfectly anticipatable, firms will 
adjust prices in such a way as to neutralize the potential impact on real outcomes of 
any policy reaction to the common public signal. It follows that 2  can be set at any 
value, without any consequences for expected welfare. 
 
To identify expected welfare under policy activism, (29) and (30) are substituted into 
equation (1), and the resulting expression maximized over 1 . The identified optimal 
value of the policy rule parameter, *
1 , is then placed into the expressions for ip p  
and y before using (1) to evaluate expected welfare when policy is set optimally. We 
find: 
 
 
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
( )
( )
( ) ( 2 )
AE W
    
 
        
      
          


 
   
            
(31) 
 
As might be expected, in the present scenario expected welfare under policy activism 
is generally higher than when there is no additional public signal (the exception being 
the extreme case which arises as 
2
   and v  becomes completely uninformative: 
in this instance, equation (31) is identical to (15)). Although, as noted, any reaction of 
policy to observations of v  is superfluous to welfare, firms use the information 
embodied in this public signal to improve their estimates of both   and p and modify 
their prices accordingly. While this additional information is not used efficiently by 
price setters, as discussed in Section 4 any improvement in the quality of public 
information is welfare-improving within the current framework.  
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Now considering equilibrium under passive policy, with the private sector directly 
observing v  as well as having the value of   revealed to it by the central bank, it is 
straightforward to find, using the methodology previously applied in the context of 
this regime, the expressions describing 
ip p  and y. These are, respectively: 
    
   
2 2
2 2 2 2 2( )
i
ip p
 
    
  
    
 
 
 
(32) 
 
   
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
( )
( )
y
  
    
    
    

 
 
  (33) 
 
Using the above expressions in conjunction with equation (1), we identify expected 
welfare with passive monetary policy but the central bank’s signal announced 
publicly: 
  
  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
[ ( )]
( )
[ ( ) ]
P
e
E W
       
   
        
    
 
 
 
 
(34) 
 
Direct comparison of (34) with (31) indicates that ( )PE W 
1 1
( )AE W
 
. Thus, the 
presence of an additional signal which is observed both by the central bank and the 
private sector does not modify our key finding that any information that is known 
only to the central bank should not be disclosed publicly, but rather should be 
reserved to provide the basis for active policy intervention.
15
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Imperfect private sector observations of policy before prices are set    
Our analysis of the activist regime is now modified by assuming that all firms observe 
the setting of the central bank’s instrument prior to determining their optimal price. 
However, these observations are assumed subject to firm-specific errors, with firm i 
observing i , where i ig   . In this context, policy plays an (imperfect) signaling 
role
16
 and provides information additional to that embodied in the private i  signals, 
not only in respect of the setting of policy itself and the information on which this 
setting is based, but also regarding  . Recent papers which incorporate a signaling 
role for policy include Walsh (2007), Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010, 2011), and Hahn 
(2014). 
 
Of course, under the passive policy regime the setting of the instrument is fixed, while 
the central bank’s signal is disclosed directly to the private sector: consequently, 
expected welfare is described, as in the analysis of Section 3, by equation (23). In 
considering activist policy we report directly the expression for expected welfare:
17
 
 
( )AE W   
        
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] ( )
[ ( ) ]
        
  
              
   
      

 
 (35) 
 
In the present case, a closed form solution for the optimal setting of the rule parameter 
is precluded by the complexity of the relationship between ( )AE W  and  . However, 
the following Proposition establishes a key result: 
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PROPOSITION 2: Define 
2 2 2ˆ /( )        . Then, evaluating expected welfare 
for  = ˆ , we find 
ˆ
( )AE W
 
 = ( )PE W . Moreover, the derivative of ( )AE W with 
respect to   evaluated at  = ˆ  is non-zero. It follows that with   set optimally 
expected welfare resulting from activist policy is unambiguously higher than under 
the passive policy regime.  
 
The result identified by Proposition 2 reflects the feature that, with the policy 
parameter set at ˆ , price-setters regard the central bank’s policy response to its 
observed signal,  , to be optimal from their individual standpoints. As a 
consequence, the information contained in firms’ noisy observations of g does not 
affect pricing decisions. Significantly, with this non-optimal (from the perspective of 
social welfare) setting of  , i.e. ˆ , attaining the identical welfare outcome to that 
associated with the passive policy regime, it follows that the latter must be 
characterized by lower welfare than is socially-optimal policy intervention.
18
  
 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
The focus of this paper has been the question of whether public disclosure of the 
central bank’s information concerning aggregate shocks can serve as a substitute for 
active stabilization policy. The preceding analysis clearly indicates that the answer to 
this question is in the negative. This is so despite the absence in our framework of any 
timing advantage for monetary policy, deriving from nominal rigidities which might 
prevent prices responding to new information as quickly as the central bank’s policy 
setting is able.  
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The crucial factor underlying this finding is, as discussed, the presence of 
heterogeneous private sector information which, in the presence of a strategic 
complementarity in price-setting, gives rise to a collectively-inefficient price response 
to central bank announcements. This inherent inefficiency is such as to imply that 
activist monetary policy, based on the central bank’s information, attains an 
unambiguously superior macroeconomic outcome. Alternative information scenarios, 
in which the private sector has additional information and which, under the activist 
regime, allows an improved estimate by firms of the setting of policy, leave this 
unequivocal conclusion unaffected. Moreover, while the framework in which this 
study’s findings were derived has a relatively basic form, it can be viewed as 
representative of a wider class of micro-founded macroeconomic models. Thus we 
would expect our principal results to remain robust to extensions of the analysis to 
more complex model structures.  
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1
 Barro (1976, p.23), for example, asserts “… when the monetary authority has 
superior information about the economy, the provision of the information to the 
public is an alternative to an active stabilization policy”, while Fischer (1977, p.194) 
concedes: “Superior information is … a weak reed on which to base the argument for 
the effectiveness of monetary policy … ”. Of course, the issue of whether the sharing 
of the monetary authorities’ information with the private sector obviates the need for 
an activist policy stance is reflective of the wider debate on the (in)effectiveness of 
policy initiated by the classic paper of Sargent and Wallace (1975), and associated 
with the development of a vast literature during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
2
 The transparency literature is well surveyed in papers by Geraats (2002), de Haan et 
al. (2007) and Blinder et al. (2008). 
3
 Within the model the natural output level (the output level which would prevail 
under full information) is constant. For convenience, we normalize its value at zero 
and, henceforth, use the terms ‘output gap’ and ‘output’ interchangeably. Note that, 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                            
because of monopoly power in the goods market, the natural level of output diverges 
from the socially-optimal output level: this divergence represents a deadweight loss 
which is independent of the policy regime for the type of shock considered here and is 
therefore suppressed from the welfare function (1). 
4
 Note that, for a given value of nominal aggregate demand, n p y  , equation (2) 
can be written as [(1 ) ]i ip E p n     with, for (0,1)  , ip  strictly increasing in 
iE p . 
5
 Assuming a normally distributed shock (as, for example, in Adam, 2007) would not 
affect the conclusions reported below in any way.  
6
 In models in which some prices are ‘sticky’ an additional source of price dispersion 
is introduced: see Woodford (2002) for the implications of different approaches to 
modeling price inertia. 
7
 In the current setting, the optimal policy rule is unique only up to an additive 
constant: for convenience we set the value of this constant at zero. 
8
 The principles underlying the optimal design of policy are discussed more fully in 
Section 4. 
9
 ‘First best’ in this context refers to the maximum attainable welfare level subject to 
the given degree of information dispersion. 
10
 This reflects a general principle: see Angeletos and Pavan (2007b)  p.1112.  
11
 If the central bank is unable, for whatever reason, to undertake stabilization policy, 
then expected welfare is invariably higher when the central bank reveals its signal 
publicly, i.e. transparency is always welfare-improving under the passive policy 
regime.  
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12
 In James and Lawler (2012b), transparency is not unambiguously inferior to non-
disclosure. This finding reflects the assumption adopted in that paper that the 
precision of private signals is not uniform across the private sector, which implies that 
stabilization policy is unable to achieve the first best welfare outcome, even in the 
absence of transparency.  
13
 We note that Baeriswyl and Cornand’s (2010) analysis of transparency assumes 
policy to be directed at maximizing a welfare function equivalent to (1) and arrive at 
conclusions similar to those identified above.      
14
 A specific example of such a signal arises if   exhibits some persistence: see the 
online appendix to James and Lawler (2011) for discussion of this in the context of 
the abstract model of that paper.  
15
 From this principle it follows that if the central bank had the capacity to prevent 
private sector access to v  but could adjust policy in response to its own observations 
of this signal, welfare under policy activism would be improved further.     
16
 If the instrument setting could be observed perfectly by firms before prices were 
set, then policy would be rendered completely ineffective and the activist and passive 
policy regimes would be associated with identical welfare outcomes. We further note 
that the presence of transmission mechanism shocks, observed by the central bank but 
not the private sector, would imply that the central bank’s signal could not be inferred 
precisely by firms even from exact observations of policy. This reintroduces policy 
effectiveness under the activist regime even in the absence of observational errors 
regarding the policy setting (see James and Lawler, 2012a). 
17
 The deviation of ip  from p is: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
{[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] }[ ( ) ]i i ip p                     
         , 
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while output is described by:  
2 2 2 2 2 2 1( ) [ ( ) ]y            

    . 
18
 The logic underlying this argument is perfectly general and is used to establish the 
non-optimality of complete transparency by the policymaker in the context of the 
abstract model employed in James and Lawler (2012a).   
